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Abstract
We consider a setting where strategic behavior of r&d firms can lead to different
types of a technology lock-in, permanent or temporary, in an eventually inferior
technology. The simple setting with one incumbent and one potential entrant may
lead to a wide variety of possible strategic regimes. We study conditions on relative
market strength of the incumbent and the entrant which lead to different strategic
actions and demonstrate, that such a strategic behavior is not always socially sub-
optimal, since it may lead to faster development of the existing technology due to
persistent threat of the potential entrant. We further elaborate on the selection of
support tools which may induce the development of new technology in the second-
best world and establish criteria for these tools to be social welfare improving ones.
Keywords: technology lock-in, technological change, strategic interaction, r&d policy,
multiple regimes
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1 Introduction
For many environmental problems, a shift to green technologies is considered to be a
promising long-term solution. A prominent example is climate change, where much hope
rests on a transition from fossil fuel based technologies to renewable energy sources. An-
other example is traffic-related air pollution, where cleaner engines or e-mobility provide
opportunities to reduce pollution levels substantially.
In this context, a crucial question is whether and to what extent a government should
interfere with technological change. It is obvious that an internalization of environmental
externalities is important to provide incentives for developing clean technologies. Ar-
guably, competition among technologies will seek out the best technological solutions
once environmental damages are correctly priced. But many countries use considerably
more fine-grained approaches to steer details of technological change. A prominent exam-
ple are feed-in tariffs for renewables. By using different tariffs for different technologies,
many countries make sure that a broad set of technologies is developed and used. Often
this approach eliminates competition among technologies (as less efficient technologies are
subsidized to an extent that ensures their use) and thus replaces market-based technology
selection with politically set targets for technology development and diffusion. Subsidies
for different new transport technologies (fuel cells, e-mobility) work in a similar way.
Not surprisingly, many economists are skeptical regarding this approach and argue
that governments might lack the necessary information to ensure efficient investments in
different options for green technologies. However, there are also economic arguments in
favor of detailed incentive schemes. Numerous studies have shown that almost unavoidable
market failures can lead to a technology lock-in; typical examples are lock-ins caused by
market power that is due to patents for new technologies (see, e.g., Krysiak (2011)) or
externalities caused by network effects in technology adoption (see Arrow (1962), Arthur
(1989), (Unruh, 2000), or (Unruh, 2002)). In such cases, it is not sufficient to only set a
price for environmental damages to ensure that the best clean technologies are developed;
more specific incentives are necessary (Krysiak, 2011).
The size and duration of such specific interventions will typically depend strongly
on different cases of market failures. For example, the development of a new promising
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technology might only be delayed or it could be prevented completely, rendering different
interventions necessary.
However, in many cases it is not easy to assess the type and scope of market failures
that might require an intervention. This holds in particular, as the potential of yet to be
developed technologies cannot be predicted with certainty. It is often hard to say whether
a new technology is not developed, because market actors expect that it is an inferior
solution (and thus do not invest) or because some actors with incumbent technologies
use their power to forestall the development of a superior competition. Furthermore, it is
hard to assess whether a development is forestalled or only delayed.
There are numerous models analyzing r&d competition between firms in a differential
game context. This literature dates back to patent races (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988). Some more recent contributions are (Dawid et al., 2010) and (Bondarev, 2014).
These studies concentrate on the r&d dynamics in a rather similar setup but do not go
into analysis of government policies. Other studies focus on the evolution of the market
structure as in (Hinloopen et al., 2013), where one firm may leave the market due to
having a weaker position. In this paper the dynamic market structure is allowed for
but the government policy is not studied. The paper (Ben-Youssef and Zaccour, 2014)
considers a dynamic r&d duopoly and government regulation, but does not allow for
strategic pricing behavior. Our contribution is the development of a framework which
accounts both for strategic behaviour of duopolists and government interventions. We
specifically focus on the market failure that could lead to a monopolization of a market
and ways to avert this problem, thus combining the effects of government policy with an
evolving market structure.
In this paper, we investigate how qualitatively different types of market failures can
arise in technological change and what kind of policy intervention is required to cope with
them. We use a simple model where, depending on the efficiency of a new technology,
an incumbent might or might not have an incentive to keep the new technology out of
the market or to delay its entrance. A government could, in addition to internalizing an
externality, provide specific support for the new technology. We show that different cases
of market failure can arise and require different levels and duration of an intervention.
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The structure of the rest of the paper is as following: Section 2 introduces the model,
in Section 3 we describe the multiplicity of arising r&d regimes, Section 4 describes the
social welfare and subsidizing schemes for different regimes of r&d, Section 5 concludes.
Most lengthy computations may be found in the Appendices section.
2 The model
We consider a setting with a production sector, where firms decide which out of two
technologies to use, and an r&d sector, where two firms develop these technologies.
In the production sector, there is perfect competition. But in the r&d sector, the firms
get a patent for their developments and are thus monopolistic suppliers of their technology.
One of the firms has an initial advantage (its technology being somewhat more developed
initially) and thus might act strategically to forestall the use and development of the
second technology.
Both r&d firms know with certainty technology characteristics of each other. In our
analysis we abstract from further market imperfections such as environmental external-
ities, assuming it is already taken care about by proper remuneration schemes in case
technologies at hand are dirty and clean ones or both are green. By doing so we apply our
study to the case of general innovations setting with green technologies being a specific
(but rather important) example of those.
2.1 The production sector
Firms in the production sector can choose among two technologies, labeled j ∈ {A,B}.
Each firm can invest in one unit of technology. The technologies differ regarding their
quality qj(t) and their price pj(t), which can change over time. Thereby the quality
influences the amount of output generated with one unit of equipment. The remuneration
per unit of output is z and is fixed over time1.
1it is possible to carry out the analysis with time-varying final product price, but analytical derivations
become much more challenging without altering the main results of the paper
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The firms have different locations, which also influence the achievable output. For
simplicity, we use a single location parameter x that influences the output achievable
with both technologies, but in different directions (one technology being more suited at
a location than the other). For example, in the case of renewable energy, some locations
might be better suited for wind power whereas others are more suitable for PV. We assume
that there is a continuum of locations x and that there is exactly one firm at each location.
The profit that this firm can obtain by using technology A or B is given by
piProdA = z (qA(t)− x)− pA(t), (1)
piProdB = z (qB(t) + x)− pB(t). (2)
We assume x ∈ [−x¯A, x¯B] ⊂ R. Thus, depending on the choice of x¯A, x¯B, locations could
be on average better suited for technology A or for technology B.
To calculate the demand for each technology, we take into account that each firm buys
one unit of equipment and each locations hosts a single firm. As long as z qj > pj holds
for j = A,B, all locations are used and thus the demand for technology j is determined
by the distance between x¯j and the location where a firm is indifferent between both
technologies. This implies the following demand functions
NProdA = x¯A −
1
2
(
pA − pB
z
− qA + qB
)
, (3)
NProdB = x¯B −
1
2
(
pB − pA
z
− qB + qA
)
. (4)
We assume that x¯j ≤ qj/2 for j = A,B, which implies that in the equilibrium derived
later, the condition z qj > pj for j = A,B will always hold. Thus these demand functions
characterize the case where both technologies are available.
If only technology A is available (which will be the case in some settings), demand for
this technology is determined by the distance between x¯A and the location where a firm
receives a profit of zero when using technology A. In this case, demand for technology A
is given by
NProdA,−B = x¯A −
(pA
z
− qA
)
. (5)
where subscript A,−B denotes the demand for A in the absence of B.
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2.2 The r&d sector
In the r&d sector, firms can invest in r&d and set prices for their technologies. Owing to
their patent, they are the sole suppliers of their respective technologies.
A firm’s r&d efforts improve the quality of its technology
q˙j(t) = gj(t)Qj − qj(t), (6)
with Qj being a measure of the efficiency of r&d for this technology and thus (implicitly)
of the long-term quality (potential) that the technology might eventually achieve.
The objective of both firms is to maximize their discounted stream of profits (value)
for a given discount rate r and with Nj being given by (3),(4)
Jj = max
pj ,gj
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
pj(t)Nj(t)− 1
2
g2j (t)
}
dt. (7)
As we allow for dynamic price adjustments, the state of both technologies influence both
firms and we thus have a differential game setup. To reduce dimensionality, we introduce
the distance between technologies as a state variable (referred to as technological gap
throughout the rest of the paper). States of both technologies and distance between them
are linked via
δ˙(t) = q˙A(t)− q˙B(t) = gA(t)QA − gB(t)QB − δ(t). (8)
The differential game thus consists of two firms maximizing the functionals (7) subject
to the common dynamic constraint (8) and the demand functions given by (3),(4), which
can also be written as functions of δ(t). The initial condition for the game is the distance
between technologies at time 0, which we denote by δ(0).
We want to analyze the most interesting case, where an older and thus somewhat more
refined technology A could potentially prevent the development of a currently less refined
technology B that, however, has the potential to become the better technology. We thus
assume δ(0) > 0, that is, technology A has the better initial quality2. Furthermore, we
assume QB > QA, that is, technology B has the better long-run potential.
2if on the contrary, δ(0) < 0 technology B has the head start and all analysis is repeated with
interchanging A and B
5
2.3 Government
We introduce the social welfare into the model to make comparisons across different
regimes of the r&d game. However we restrain from formulating any subsidies/taxes at
this stage, to keep the analysis focused on strategic behavior of the firms. The net social
benefit consists of a marginal benefit β attached to each unit of production with both
technologies3 minus locational costs, minus the costs of developing the technologies. For
simplicity, we assume that the social planner uses the same discount rate r as the r&d
firms. Social welfare is thus given by:
W :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
β (NA(t) (qA(t) + ΞA(t)) +NB(t) (qB(t) + ΞB(t)))− 1
2
(
g2A(t) + g
2
B(t)
)}
dt,
(9)
where Ξj(t) denotes the average effect of used locations on output for technology j.
In case that both technologies are available, these costs are given by4
ΞA(t) =
x¯2A
2
− (pA(t)− pB(t)− z (qA(t)− qB(t)))
2
8 z2
, (10)
ΞB(t) =
x¯2B
2
− (pA(t)− pB(t)− z (qA(t)− qB(t)))
2
8 z2
. (11)
In case only technology A is used, we get
Ξ(t) =
x¯2A
2
− 1
2 z2
(pA(t)− z qA(t))2 . (12)
In Section 4 we compute W associated with different outcomes of the game and study what
ranking is induced across social welfare by different strategic actions of the incumbent firm.
3 Regimes of the r&d sector
To assess whether the government should subsidize the initially weaker technology, it
is important to analyze the dynamics of technological development. The model admits
several qualitatively different cases: Both firms might develop their technologies simulta-
neously, firm B might decide not to enter the market, firm A could use strategic pricing
3For simplicity, we assume that both technologies induce the same marginal benefit.
4This follows directly from (3)–(4).
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to delay development of technology B (temporary technology lock-in), and firm A might
keep firm B from ever developing its technology (permanent technology lock-in).
To prepare the analysis of policy interventions, we first investigate these cases sequen-
tially and then show under which conditions which case will emerge as the solution of the
game. Throughout the exposition we move all intermediate calculations and results to
appendices referred to throughout the main text.
3.1 Simultaneous play: both technologies are present
In case both technologies are available, (3)–(4) describe the relevant demand system. The
optimal price schedules for both firms as functions of the technological gap are then
pA(t) = z x¯A +
z δ(t)
2
+
pB(t)
2
, pB(t) = z x¯B − z δ(t)
2
+
pA(t)
2
; (13)
p∗A(t) =
z
3
(4 x¯A + 2 x¯B + δ(t)) , (14)
p∗B(t) =
z
3
(4 x¯B + 2 x¯A − δ(t)) . (15)
where the superscript ∗ denotes optimally chosen prices. Thus revenue for each firm is a
function of the quality difference between technologies only:
p∗A(t)N
∗
A(t) = S
A
1 δ
2(t) + SA2 δ(t) + S
A
3 ,
p∗B(t)N
∗
B(t) = S
B
1 δ
2(t) + SB2 δ(t) + S
B
3 , (16)
with SA1 = S
B
1 =
z2
18
, SA2 :=
z (4 x¯A+2 x¯B)
9
, SB2 :=
z (2 x¯A+4 x¯B)
9
, SA3 :=
(4 x¯A+2 x¯B)
2
18
, and
SB3 :=
(2 x¯A+4 x¯B)
2
18
. With the above price choices, the firms still have to choose their r&d
efforts. Given the above revenues, firm A has an incentive to increase δ(t), whereas firm
B wants to reduce the quality difference. This constitutes a standard non-cooperative
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differential game5:
JA = max
gA(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
p∗A N
∗
A −
1
2
g2A
}
dt,
JB = max
gB(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
p∗B N
∗
B −
1
2
g2B
}
dt,
s.t.
δ˙ = gA QA − gB QB − δ,
δ(0) = qA(0)− qB(0) = δ0,
gA, gB ∈ [0;∞) ⊂ R+ (17)
where the last condition ensures nonnegative controls.
An application of Maximum Principle6 yields optimal investments of both firms and
state dynamics7:
δ∗ = δ0e
1
2
(
r−
√
(r+2)2− 4
9
z2(Q2A+Q
2
B)
)
t
+
(SA2 Q
2
A + S
B
2 Q
2
B)(e
1
2
(
r−
√
(r+2)2− 4
9
z2(Q2A+Q
2
B)
)
t − 1)
1
9
z2(Q2A +Q
2
B)− (1 + r)
(18)
g∗A = 4e
1
2
(r−√X) t (FA1 δ0 + FA2 )− FA3 , (19)
g∗B = −4e
1
2
(r−√X) t (FB1 δ0 + FB2 )− FB3 , (20)
Details of derivation may be found in Appendix A and definitions of coefficients in Ap-
pendix F.
The time t∗, when technology B catches up with technology A, is therefore (from
δ∗(t∗) = 0):
t∗ = 2
ln
(
(SA2 Q
2
A+S
B
2 Q
2
B)
δ0(
1
9
z2(Q2A+Q
2
B)−(1+r))+(SA2 Q2A+SB2 Q2B)
)
r −
√
(r + 2)2 − 4
9
z2(Q2A +Q
2
B)
. (21)
The illustration of the typical simultaneous development of both technologies is given
by Figure 1. We denote by δj∗ such initial technology gaps, that simultaneous play yields
5From now on we omit time argument to condense notation everywhere where it is possible.
6we derive only the open-loop solution for this game and mean everywhere by solution the open-loop
one. Main results hold for the closed loop also, but with substantial analytical complications.
7assuming smooth interior solution ∀t, ∀j : g∗j > 0 with both firms remaining operative infinitely long,
condition for that see Appendix A
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Figure 1: Evolution of rival technologies with simultaneous play
zero value for firm j once δ0 = δ
j
∗.
3.2 Sole innovator: Uncontested monopoly and strategic pricing
We next describe two regimes, where only firm A is present on the market, but with
differing price schedules.
3.2.1 Unrestricted monopoly
If firm B does not enter the market, because the initial gap between technologies is so
large that firm B’s value becomes negative (i. e. max{δB∗ } > δ0 > min{δB∗ } see Appendix
C for details), we obtain the case of unrestricted monopoly of firm A.
In this case, we get the usual monopolistic price and revenue functions:
pMA =
z
(
x¯A + δ
M
)
2
, pMA (t)N
M
A (t) = S
M
1 δ
2(t) + SM2 δ(t) + S
M
3 (22)
with δM(t) = qMA (t) − qB(0), depending on the state of technology A only, and SM1 =
z
4
,SM2 =
z x¯A
2
, and SM3 =
z x¯2A
2
.
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The monopolist’a problem is a standard optimal control problem:
JMA = max
gA(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
pMA (t)N
M
A (t)−
1
2
g2A
}
dt,
s.t.
δ˙ = gA QA − δ,
gA ∈ [0;∞) ⊂ R+ (23)
The Maximum Principle yields the following technology development and investments:
δM(t) = δ0e
1
2
(
r−
√
(r+2)2−8SM1 Q2A
)
t
+
SM2 Q
2
A(e
1
2
(
r−
√
(r+2)2−8SM1 Q2A
)
t − 1)
2SM1 Q
2
A − (1 + r)
gMA = F
M
1 δ0e
1
2
(r−√Xm)t + FM2 e
1
2
(r−√Xm)t − FM3 (24)
with Xm := (r + 2)
2 − 8SM1 Q2A (and real-valued solution exists only if Xm > 0) and with
FM1,2,3 being functions of monopolist’s demand parameters and efficiency of investments
QA specified in the Appendix F.
3.2.2 Strategic pricing
If firm B position is strong enough to enter the market, firm A may have an incentive to
prevent its entry. If firm A has a sufficiently strong advantage, it can keep the other firm
off the market. To do so, it has to set the price of its technology in such a way, that firm
B does not gain by entering the market. More precisely, firm A has to set its price so
that, even with its best response, firm B cannot achieve a total discounted profit stream
that is strictly greater than zero.
This strategic price, ensuring firm B does not enter the market is
pSA = z (δ − 2 x¯B) . (25)
Details of derivation are in Appendix B.
If strategic pricing is implemented (conditions of Lemma 8 from Appendix B hold)
permanently, firm B never enters the market. In this case, the resulting technology
state and investments are derived by the same Maximum principle application as for
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uncontested monopoly case albeit with price given by (25):
δS = δ0e
−t +
SS1 Q
2
A(1− e−t)
(1 + r)
(26)
δ¯S =
SS1 Q
2
A
1 + r
(27)
gSA = QAS
S
1 (28)
where δS = qSA(t)− qB(0) and SS1 = z(x¯A + 2x¯B).
3.3 Piecewise solutions: temporary strategic pricing
Observe that solution given by (26) is valid only if strategic pricing is implemented in-
definitely long. Still, it might be that firm A will be able only to delay the entry of firm
B via strategic pricing, that is, firm A might switch from strategic pricing to the pricing
analyzed in subsection 3.1. Moreover it might be the case that temporary strategic pric-
ing is sufficient to permanently prevent B’s entry and firm A switches to monopolistic
behavior studied in subsection 3.2.
3.3.1 Temporary strategic pricing with permanent technology lock-in:
(un)contested monopoly
First consider the case when firm A is able to develop its technology to such a level, that
it is no longer profitable for firm B to enter the market even in the absence of strategic
pricing. This is possible, if there exists a value of technology gap δB∗ , after reaching
which at some time tP the value for the firm B upon entrance is non-positive in the
simultaneous development regime. Condition for such permanent lock-in are stated by
Lemma 9 in Appendix C.
If this is the case, the objective for firm A is:
JPA = max
gA(•)
{∫ tP
0
e−rt
{
pSAN
S
A −
1
2
(
gSA
)2}
dt+
∫ ∞
tP
e−rt
{
pMA N
M
A −
1
2
(
gMA
)2}
dt
}
. (29)
with P superscript denoting piecewise strategic-monopolistic regime. We label it by un-
contested monopoly to contrast it with the contested monopoly described further.
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The optimal control problem solution for the case (29) is also obtained via Maximum
Principle and the resulting state dynamics is a piecewise system8:
δ˙P (t) =
δ˙S(t), t < tP ,δ˙M(t), t ≥ tP , δM(tP ) = δB∗ . (31)
where δ˙S, δ˙M are dynamical systems associated with permanent strategic pricing and
unrestricted monopoly respectively and δB∗ is the threshold technology gap value.
Figure 2a illustrates possible (un)contested monopoly cases. As firm A anticipates the
change in the strategy from gS to gM , the solution differs from the monopolistic and from
strategic ones. It is always the case that
δM(t) ≤ δP (t) ≤ δS(t) (32)
The longer it takes to prevent the entry of firm B, the closer the resulting technology
evolution is to δS and vice versa: the sooner the strategic pricing stops, the closer the
evolution is to the monopolistic one.
3.3.2 Temporary strategic pricing with temporary technology lock-in: delay
Next we study the case when position of firm A is not strong enough to prevent entrance of
firm B forever, but it still finds it profitable to price strategically for some time, delaying
firm’s B entry. We label it as a delay.
In this case there exists a threshold value of technology gap δd upon reaching which
at a time td it is no longer profitable for firm A to continue with strategic pricing and
8in fact, as long as δ¯S > δ¯M two cases are possible: either δ¯M > δB∗ or vice versa. In the first case
the dynamics is described by (31), but in the other case it is not possible for the firm A to switch to the
uncontested monopoly from subsection 3.2. It can still stop strategic pricing and price monopolistically,
but has to sustain the threshold level of technology gap δ∗B . We refer to this case as contested monopoly
and it is described by
δ˙C(t) =
δ˙S(t), t < tP ,0, t ≥ tP , δ(t) = δB∗ . (30)
with superscript C denoting contested monopoly regime.
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(a) Contested monopoly for tP = 1 (b) Delay for δd = 0.8
Figure 2: Piecewise regimes of the model
it allows the entry of firm B, while firm B still finds it profitable to enter the market
(conditions for that stated by Lemma 12 in Appendix E). We thus have a mixed optimal
control-differential game for firm A with the objective
JdA = max
gA(•)
{∫ td
0
e−rt
{
pSAN
S
A −
1
2
(
gSA
)2}
dt+
∫ ∞
td
e−rt
{
p∗AN
∗
A −
1
2
(g∗A)
2
}
dt
}
. (33)
and differential game for firm B starting at time td at initial gap δd with the objective
JdB = max
gB(•)
{∫ ∞
td
e−rt
{
p∗BN
∗
B −
1
2
(g∗B)
2
}
dt
}
. (34)
The application of standard technique results in the piecewise state dynamics:
δ˙d =
δ˙S, t < td,δ˙∗, t ≥ td, δ∗(td) = δd.
Observe that in the case of temporary delay the solution again is piecewise-defined and
hence fully informed players have dynamics different from both the strategic and simul-
taneous play regimes, as illustrated by the Figure 2b.
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It always holds that δ∗(t) < δd(t) < δS(t) in analogue with strategic piecewise solution
described above.
We thus observe that the simple framework with two firms allows for rich set of possible
outcomes if no entry costs are assumed. We next move to classifying and characterizing
conditions, under which these cases may arise.
3.4 Choosing a game to play
So far, we have analyzed a number of possible outcomes. To answer the question which
case realizes we compare values of firms under different outcomes. Define by Πmj the value
of firm j ∈ {A,B} in regime m ∈ {∗,M, S, P, C, d} = O computed at time 0, where labels
in set O denote associated regimes described above. Denote further F ⊆ O the set of
feasible outcomes of the game.
It turns out that value of both firms in all regimes can be represented as polynomials
of at most 2nd degree (See Appendix C for details). Denote by δjm roots of polynomials
type Πmj in δ0.
We compare the strategic pricing and the monopoly cases from the perspective of firm
A. The value function of firm A under permanent strategic pricing and under monopoly
(given in Appendix C) have roots δAS , δ
A
M . Value under monopoly is greater than under
strategic regime9, thus firm A will try to switch from strategic regime to monopoly as
soon as possible.
Next, we inquire whether strategic pricing is feasible and profitable. Feasibility is
worked out by Lemma 10, and profitability condition is given by Lemma 11, both from
Appendix D. If conditions of both lemmas hold, firm A behaves strategically for the
time tP defined in Lemma 9 (see Appendix C) and switches to monopolistic behavior
afterwards (contested or uncontested).
At last, if there is no option to permanently deter the entrance by temporary strategic
pricing (δB∗ > δ¯
S), it might be still possible (and profitable) to delay the entrance of firm
B. This case is worked out in Lemma 12 in Appendix E.
9since it is always the case that pMA > p
S
A and monopoly is profit maximizing while strategic forestaller
is not
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We thus observe three different types of strategic behavior, with two of them leading
to permanent lock-in and another one to temporary lock-in on the industry in an inferior
technology A. We need thus a unified characterization of all those cases of strategic
behavior. We state this result next.
Proposition 1 (Strategic regimes algebraization).
• If max{δB∗ } > δ0 > min{δB∗ } and max{δAM} > δ0 > min{δAM}, the unrestricted
monopoly of firm A earning ΠMA realizes;
• If Lemma 8 holds, strategic pricing is feasible for firm A and, if in addition min{δd} ≤
δ0, strategic pricing is also profitable.
• If Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 hold, strategic pricing is implemented for tP , given by (C.6),
and firm B never enters the market. Firm A switches to the uncontested monopoly
regime after tP and earns ΠPA if min{δB∗ } < δ¯M or to contested monopoly preserving
the threshold level min{δB∗ } otherwise earning ΠCA.
• If Lemma 9 does not hold, but Lemma 12 holds and Condition (E.4) is met, strategic
pricing is implemented for t ∈ [0, td[ (given by (E.2)) and firm B enters at time td.
Firm A earns ΠdA and firm B earns Π
d
B|δ0=δd.
• If Condition (E.4) does not hold, but Condition (E.5) holds, the delay option results
in permanent strategic pricing with firm A earning ΠSA.
Proof. The first point follows from assumption on leading coefficients of value functions
to be of opposite signs and definitions of δjm values. Other points follow from lemmas
contained in Appendix.
This proposition shows that, even in our rather simple model, qualitatively different
cases of strategic behavior can arise. It is possible that the development of technology
B is only delayed, it can be prevented for ever by permanent strategic pricing, or firm A
could attain an advantage after some time, where firm B would never enter the market,
even if firm A stops strategic pricing. More importantly it relates the cases of strategic
behavior with a single observable parameter δ and its threshold values.
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It is straightforward to translate the result of Proposition 1 into the comparison of
potentials of competing technologies (as these are the main parameters of interest).
Corollary 1 (Impact of technologies’ potentials on values of r&d).
For all polynomials type Πmj it holds that
∂|δjm|
∂Q−j
≤ 0, ∂|δ
j
m|
∂Qj
≤ 0, (35)
thus the higher is the potential of both technologies, the lower is the range of initial gap,
for which simultaneous play may happen.
Proof. Showing (35) amounts to differentiating the roots of polynomials given in Appendix
w.r.t. Qj.
Next, observe that (35) characterizes the decrease in the length of the interval in
δ axis, for which the simultaneous game takes place. If initial gap is inside of the
interval [min{δB∗ },max{δB∗ }], firm B will not engage into the competitive development
game. Firm A will not engage into the game once the initial gap is outside the interval
[min{δA∗ },max{δA∗ }]. Thus the r&d game will take place only if δ0 lies in the intersection
of [min{δA∗ },max{δA∗ }] with one of (−∞,min{δB∗ }], [max{δB∗ },+∞). Denote this by I(∗),
interval of r&d game realization. Since we limited exposition to δ0 > 0 it follows that
with increase in potentials the intersection of the I(∗) with positive range of δ becomes
smaller.
4 Social welfare
4.1 Social welfare comparisons
Proposition 1 shows that there are several distinct cases in which a technology lock-in
occurs; the incumbent (firm A) uses its advantage to prevent or delay the entry of the
competing firm B.
The first question is under which conditions this is socially suboptimal, that is, when
should technology B be developed. To this end, we have to evaluate and compare social
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welfare, as defined by (9), for the different cases of simultaneous development, delayed
development, forestalled development and unrestricted monopoly.
Denote by Wm the social welfare resulting from outcome m ∈ F of the r&d game
above and further denote
Dm(W ) = W
∗ −Wm (36)
the social welfare difference between the given regime m and the simultaneous develop-
ment regime10 e. g. for m = M ∈ F we have:
DM(W )
def
= W ∗ −WM =
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
β (N∗A(t) (q
∗
A(t) + Ξ
∗
A(t)) +N
∗
B(t) (q
∗
B(t) + Ξ
∗
B(t)))−
1
2
(
(g∗A(t))
2 + (g∗B(t))
2
)}
dt−∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
βNMA (t)
(
qMA (t) + Ξ
M
A (t)
)− 1
2
(gMA (t))
2
}
dt (37)
This expression depends on potentials of both technologies, initial conditions and the
characteristic of locations better suited to one or the other technology. If we take charac-
teristics of technology A (QA, qA(0), x¯A) fixed, the social welfare difference is positive and
increases in QB, qB(0) as long as x¯B  x¯A reflecting the high market potential of tech-
nology B (it is better suited for more sites). However, as soon as x¯B < x¯A, the monopoly
of technology A might be social welfare improving. This is illustrated by Figure 3.
It is interesting to note, that the higher is the potential of technology B, the lower
is the social welfare under simultaneous development, provided the condition x¯B  x¯A
holds (see Figure 3b). At the same time as soon as x¯B  x¯A, the higher is the potential
of B, the higher is welfare under simultaneous development (see Figure 3c).
The difference in social welfare (37) is the 3d degree polynomial in qB(0) of the form
WM1 qB(0)
3 +WM2 qB(0)
2 +WM3 qB(0) +W
M
4 (38)
10of course we could define more generally Dm,k(W ) = W
k−Wm, ∀{m, k} ∈ O, but we limit exposition
to comparisons with simultaneous behavior here for brevity reasons
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(a) Different x¯B , QB > QA (b) Different QB ,x¯B  x¯A (c) Different QB ,x¯B  x¯A
Figure 3: Social welfare under simultaneous development and monopoly
where superscript M denotes that difference is taken with respect to monopoly. Its leading
coefficient WM1 is always negative
11:
WM1 =
zβ
(
−4 zQA2 − 4 Q2B 2z +
√
−4 zQA2 − 4 QB 2z + 9 r2 + 36 r + 36r + 9 r2 + 36 r + 36
)
432
√
−4 QB 2z − 4 zQA2 + 9 (r + 2)2
((
QA
2 + QB
2
)
z − 2 r2 − 9 r − 9)
(39)
and does not depend on initial technologies’ states, thus the resulting welfare is higher
under monopoly starting from some qB(0) which is given by the maximal root of the
equation (38) and always higher for competitive case for qB(0) values below the minimal
root of that polynomial.
There are potentially up to three values of technology B initial state (being functions
of demand potentials and potentials for development of both technologies), separating
regimes where monopoly is preferred to simultaneous development and vice versa. De-
note roots of the polynomial (37) in qB(0) by qˆ
M
B {1, 2, 3} with superscript denoting the
difference with monopoly and indexed such that qˆMB {1} < qˆMB {2} < qˆMB {3}. We have then
the following:
11indeed, since square root has to be positive, and expression has the form (x−y)+
√
x−y√
x−y·α(y−x) , α < 1 and
y < x to yield real values
18
Lemma 1. Simultaneous development is social welfare improving over the monopoly of
technology A as long as:
1. Either 0 ≤ qB(0) < qˆMB {1}
2. Either 0 ≤ qˆMB {2} < qB(0) < qˆMB {3}
Proof. Follows from the negative leading coefficient in (38) and shape of 3d degree poly-
nomials algebraic curves.
Next consider the social welfare under infinitely forestalled development of technology
B and simultaneous development.
The difference in social welfare is defined equivalently to (37) as
DS(W )
def
= W ∗ −W S = W S1 qB(0)3 +W S2 qB(0)2 +W S3 qB(0) +W S4 (40)
with the help of objective functional (9) and associated solutions to the original two-
states problem in qA, qB. This is again the 3d degree polynomial in qB(0) with coefficients
denoted W S1,2,3,4. Denote its roots by qˆ
S
B{1, 2, 3}. Then we have the same result as for
monopoly case:
Lemma 2. As long as W S1 > 0, simultaneous development is socially welfare improving
over strategic forestall by firm A if qB(0) > qˆ
S
B{3} > 0 or 0 < qˆSB{1} < qB(0) < qˆSB{2}.
As long as W S1 < 0,simultaneous development is socially welfare improving over strate-
gic forestall by firm A if 0 < qB(0) < qˆ
S
B{1} or 0 < qˆSB{2} < qB(0) < qˆSB{3}.
Proof. The same as for Lemma (1) but for positive and negative leading coefficients
cases.
If we compare the social welfare under monopoly and strategic permanent pricing, it
turns out that the social welfare under monopoly can be higher or lower than under strate-
gic forestall depending on the market potential of technology B, x¯B. This is illustrated
by Figure 4, which is the result of different signs of leading coefficients in polynomials
(38),(40).
The same logic applies for the delayed development: it may not necessarily lie in
between the simultaneous development and strategic permanent forestall. Thus both
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Figure 4: Difference in social welfare under monopoly and strategic forestall
δP (t), δd(t) regimes are to be taken into account. We need some invariant measure of
social optimality of simultaneous development case. For that we use the choice function
defined as:
Definition 1. A choice function (selector, selection) is a mathematical function f that is
defined on some collection X of non empty sets and assigns to each set S in that collection
some element f(S) of S.
It is provided by the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 (Selector for socially optimal regime).
The simultaneous development of both technologies is socially optimal across all possible
regimes m ∈ O iff qB(0) lies in the intersection of positive intervals of all respective
polynomials, i. e. there exists a selector
Ψ(qB(0)) :
∏
m∈O
Dm(W )|qB(0) > 0 (41)
Proof. The product
∏
m∈ODm(W ) is positive only if all of components are positive, mean-
ing simultaneous development is better than any other regime in social welfare terms. This
product is a rational function (product of finitely many polynomials), and has finite num-
ber of intervals with changing sign. Thus as soon as qB(0) lies in one of such intervals, it
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is better for social planner to have simultaneous development than any other regime of
the game.
It is immediate to note that the same type of selectors may be obtained for social
optimality of any other regime. We omit this since we are primarily interested in simul-
taneous development regime.We now can summarize our social welfare results in terms of
choice functions over regimes as following:
Proposition 2 (Social welfare algebraization).
The outcome s ∈ F of the r&d game is socially optimal among outcomes F ⊆ O if qB(0)
lies in the union of intervals where social welfare is higher under outcome s than under
any other m ∈ F , i. e. there exists the choice function:
Ψ(F) : qB(0) ∈
⋃
m∈F
⋂
m∈F
[qˆs,mB {z}; qˆs,mB {z + 1}] :
Ds,m(W ) ≥ 0 =⇒
Ψ(F) = arg max
m∈F
Wm(qB) = s. (42)
In particular, the outcome ∗ is welfare-optimal if ∗ ∈ F and Ψ(F) = ∗.
Proof. follows from the direct computation of social welfare defined above and comparison
of the roots of resulting polynomials in qB(0).
The particular application of Proposition 2 to the case of simultaneous development
yields combined results of Lemmas 1, 2
Corollary 2 (Social optimality of simultaneous development).
One of the following cases hold:
1. As long as both max{qˆMB } < 0,max{qˆSB} < 0 or ∀j ∈ 1, 2, 3 : qB(0) > max{qˆSB{j}, qˆMB {j}} >
0 it is never socially optimal to allow monopoly or strategic behavior of firm A;
2. If maxj{qˆMB {j}} > qB(0) > maxj{qˆSB{j}} > 0 it is socially optimal to allow
monopoly regime but not the strategic regime;
3. If maxj{qˆMB {j}} > maxj{qˆSB{j}} > qB(0) > 0 it is socially optimal to allow strategic
pricing regime and turn it into monopoly by proper subsidizing technology A;
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4. If maxj{qˆSB{j}} > maxj{qˆSB{j}} > qB(0) > 0 it is socially optimal to allow perma-
nent strategic pricing
Proof. Application of Proposition 2 to the case s = ∗.
It should be noticed that cases 2, 3, 4 above can be realized only for low x¯B  x¯A
new technology market potential. We thus assume in the rest of the paper that case 1
holds, i. e. parameters are set up in such a way, that it is socially optimal to have both
technologies being developed.
Corollary 3 (Impact of technologies’ potential on welfare).
There exists x¯∗j > x¯−j : ∀x¯j > x¯∗j it holds:
∂qˆmj
∂Qj
≤ 0, ∂qˆ
m
j
∂Q−j
≥ 0 (43)
In particular if case 1 of Corollary 2 takes place, the higher is the potential of B, the less
initial qB(0) suffices for socially optimal simultaneous development.
Proof. Amounts to computing derivatives of roots of Dm(W ) polynomials with respect to
potentials. Since as long as qB(0) is higher than any of the roots qˆ
S
B{j}, qˆMB {j} it is optimal
to develop both technologies, increase of QB decreases these roots and thus increases the
range of qB(0) for which development of B is socially desirable.
Using Proposition 2 it is straightforward to compute social welfare under different
policy schemes and compare it with sole development of A regimes. This is done by
replacing q∗B, q
∗
A terms in Dm(W ) polynomials by q
σk
j terms, which are optimal open loop
solutions of the associated differential game of r&d firms under given subsidy level σk. For
that we first derive some policy schemes and then conclude with statements over social
optimality of subsidized r&d regimes.
4.2 Policy schemes preventing strategic behavior
To prevent strategic pricing, the government can use a subsidy that is paid for each unit
of technology B. We do not ask the optimality, but only feasibility of such subsidies at
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this stage12. Such a subsidy σ alters the reaction functions of both firms:
pA(t) = z x¯A +
z δ(t)
2
+
pB(t)
2
, pB(t) = z x¯A − z δ(t)
2
+
pA(t)
2
− 1
2
σ; (44)
The resulting equilibrium prices for both firms are
pσA =
1
3
(z (4 x¯A + 2 x¯B + δ(t))− σ) = p∗A −
1
3
σ,
pσB =
1
3
(z (2 x¯A + 4 x¯B − δ(t))− 2 σ) = p∗B −
2
3
σ. (45)
In the following, we discuss subsidies for the different cases of strategic behavior described
by the Proposition 1. We thereby derive different bounds for the subsidy and its duration.
Given the above reaction functions, the strategic price of firm A that will reduce the
profit of firm B to zero is now subsidy-dependent:
p−σ,SA = z δ − 2 z x¯B − σ. (46)
Thus the subsidy level that makes strategic pricing infeasible (reducing firm A’s revenues
to zero) follows from p−σ,SA = 0 and is
σmax = z δ(t)− 2 z x¯B = pSA. (47)
Given that δ(t) declines over time when both firms develop their technology, the maximal
required subsidy size is thus
σ+
def
= z δ0 − 2 z x¯B. (48)
This maximal subsidy is constant and thus easy to implement. However, the state-
dependent (and thus declining) subsidy σmax suffices to prevent strategic pricing in all
regimes.
The corresponding duration of the subsidy can be derived from the condition in Lemma
8, as this is a necessary and the least demanding condition for strategic pricing. Denoting
the solution of the simultaneous development game with the subsidy by δσ, we get the
following result.
12the first-best subsidy is always defined within a Stackelberg game with government playing a leader.
However this first-best subsidy is not computationally feasible even in our simple setup and we characterize
several simpler subsidizing schemes being aware of there second-best optimality.
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Lemma 4 (Maximal size and duration of subsidy).
To prevent strategic pricing of firm A, it is sufficient to set the subsidy level at σmax and
pay it no longer than
tmax : δσ(tmax) = 2 x¯B. (49)
This duration is always shorter than the time required for technology B to catch up to
technology A.
As a second step, we consider the subsidy level and duration that render strategic
pricing non-profitable. Let us first consider the case of permanent strategic pricing. The
condition that strategic pricing is not profitable in this case, implies that the profit streams
under permanent strategic pricing and simultaneous development starting at level δσ are
equal:
δσ : Π
S
A,∞|δ0=δσ = Π∗A,∞|δ0=δσ . (50)
With (C.1) and (C.4), this results in a quadratic equation for δσ, which is similar to (E.1).
Comparing this condition with those of Lemma 11, we observe that δσ is given by the
same polynomial as δd (see Appendix D). The minimal duration of a subsidy is thus given
by
tmin : δσ(tmin) = δσ = min{δd}. (51)
The subsidy level that is necessary to prevent permanent strategic pricing is defined by
the condition
σmin : pi
S
A,∞|pA=p−σ,SA = pi
∗
A,∞|pA,B=pσA,B , (52)
which compares the revenue streams at each time t < tmin for firm A under the strategic
and the simultaneous development regimes. The value of σ that reduces this difference
to zero, is given by the larger root of the following second degree polynomial:
p−σ,SA (σ)N
S
A − pσANσA = 0→ σmin = z (δ(t)− 4 x¯B − 2 x¯A) . (53)
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This value depends on the state δ(t). As the state is decreasing function of time under
the subsidy regime, the corresponding constant subsidy is always higher:
σ−
def
= z (δ0 − 4 x¯B − 2 x¯A) ≥ σmin. (54)
The minimal state-dependent subsidy is always lower than the maximal one for any δ, as
it can be inferred from comparison of (47) and (53).
Now, we turn to non-permanent strategic pricing, as described by Lemma 9. If this
lemma holds, the strategic pricing regime lasts only for tP . Thus the profitability of
strategic pricing for firm A could be higher and is limited by the monopolistic profit.
Thus the subsidy should continue for
tsuff : δσ(tsuff ) = δσ = min{δ−}, (55)
whenever tP <∞. Obviously, tsuff > tmin, as min{δM} < min{δd}.
In this case, the level of the subsidy that is sufficient to prevent strategic pricing is
given by the condition
σsuff : pi
M
A,∞|pA=p−σ,MA = pi
∗
A,∞|pA,B=pσA,B . (56)
where
p−σ,MA =
z
(
x¯A + δ
M
)
2
− σ (57)
Repeating our arguments regarding σmin, we see that σsuff has to be the maximal root of
polynomial over σ given by the difference in revenue streams between the monopoly and
the simultaneous development regime:
p−σ,MA (σ)N
M
A − pσANσA = 0→
σsuff =
z
36 + z
(
3Xsuff + 3δ + 6x¯A +
(
x¯A + 2x¯B − 1
2
δ
)
z
)
δ≤δ2≥ σmin, (58)
where Xsuff is specified in the Appendix, and where δ2 is the value of δ above which the
sufficient subsidy becomes lower than the minimal one.
As above, we can complement this state-dependent subsidy with a constant, suffi-
cient subsidy that might be easier to implement by replacing the time-varying difference
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between the states of the technologies with the initial gap:
σo
def
=
z
36 + z
(
3Xsuff |δ=δ0 + 3δ0 + 6x¯A +
(
x¯A + 2x¯B − 1
2
δ
)
z
)
≥ σsuff ,
σo
δ0≤δ2≥ σ−. (59)
As long as both firms are present on the market, δ is always decreasing till the steady
state level. Thus, for the minimal duration tmin to be lower than the maximal duration
tmax it is necessary that
tmin ≤ tsuff ≤ tmax : δd ≥ δ− ≥ 2 x¯B. (60)
Note that the size of subsidies is not always ordered in the same way:
δ2 > δ > δ1  σmax > σsuff > σmin (61)
where δ1 is defined by the intersection of σmax and σsuff and δ2 is defined by the inter-
section of σsuff and σmin. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between different levels of
subsidizing.
Altogether, we have proven the following result.
Lemma 5 (Minimal size and duration of the subsidy).
To prevent strategic pricing of firm A, it is necessary to set the subsidy level at σmin and
pay it at least tmin. It is sufficient to pay the subsidy at the level σsuff during t
suff
It holds that tmin < tsuff < tmax and σmin < σsuff < σmax as long as (60), (61) hold.
The exact size and duration lie within the following boundaries
σmin ≤ σ(tP ) ≤ σsuff , ∂σ(t
P )
∂tP
< 0;
tmin ≤ tσ(tP ) ≤ tsuff , ∂t
σ(tP )
∂tP
< 0,
lim
tP→∞
σ(tP )→ σmin, lim
tP→0
σ(tP )→ σsuff ,
lim
tP→∞
tσ(tP )→ tmin, lim
tP→0
tσ(tP )→ tsuff . (62)
Finally, let us consider the last remaining case, that is, delayed development. Here,
Lemma 9 does not hold, that is, it is not possible to keep firm B permanently out of the
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Figure 5: Relative subsidies sizes as functions of the state
market, but Lemma 12 holds, so that there is an option for delaying the entrance of firm
B.
In this case, the subsidy duration tmin is sufficient to prevent the delay. Indeed, we
have δσ = δd and thus if no δ∗B ≤ δ¯S exists, the duration tmin is both necessary and
sufficient, irrespective of whether the strategic delay is temporary or permanent.13 This
yields the following result
Lemma 6 (Subsidy size and duration for the case of strategic delay).
In conditions of Lemma 12 it is both necessary and sufficient to set the subsidy at σmin, t
min
levels to prevent the strategic delay option.
Summarizing our results on preventing strategic pricing under full information, we get
the following proposition.
13This holds, as the delay duration is defined by max{δd}, whereas the subsidy duration is defined by
min{δd}.
27
Proposition 3 (Subsidy to prevent strategic pricing).
1. If Lemmas 8, 9, and 10 hold, the subsidy is set at the level σsuff and paid till
t = tsuff , if (60)–(61) holds, or at σmax till t = t
max otherwise;
2. If Lemma 9 does not hold, but Lemma 12 holds, the subsidy is set at σmin and paid
till t = tmin;
3. If one of the Lemmas 8 or 11 does not hold, there is no need for a subsidy.
This proposition shows that the different cases of strategic behavior considered in the
preceding section ask for different responses by the regulator.
4.3 Social welfare under subsidizing schemes
Previous subsection answered the question what kind of subsidy should be implemented to
prevent each possible kind of strategic behaviour. The answer depends on the initial gap
between both technologies. However the question whether it is socially welfare improving
to implement a subsidy is still open.
We use the same approach as in subsection 4.1, deriving and comparing social welfare
under different regimes. We have identified six different subsidizing schemes, three of them
constant and three state-dependent. It turns out that the quantities D(W ) computed in
the same manner as in (37), are 2nd degree polynomials in qB(0) for constant subsidies
and 3d degree polynomials for state-dependent subsidies. As such, they allow to derive
analytically the threshold levels, which indicate whether the given subsidy is socially
optimal.
For constant subsidizing schemes the social welfare decreases in the size of subsidy.
Thus as long as the ordering of subsidies size σ+ > σo > σ− holds, it also holds that
Dm(W )
σ− > Dm(W )
σo > Dm(W )
σ+ where superscripts denote the implemented subsidiz-
ing scheme. Since all these polynomials are of the same degree it then follows, that the
maximal roots of them in qB(0) also have the same ordering.
The same is true for state-dependent subsidies, but with 3d degree polynomials. We
thus have:
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Lemma 7. The subsidies defined by the Proposition 3 are implemented only if the maximal
root of the associated polynomial Dm(W )
σ is lower than qB(0).
Denote associated maximal roots by ˆˆqσmaxm ,
ˆˆq
σsuff
m , ˆˆqσminm ,
ˆˆqσ+m ,
ˆˆqσom ,
ˆˆqσ−m where superscript
denotes the polynomial Dm(W )
σ from which the roots are taken. Denote further by
Θ(F) the choice function (as in Lemma 3) for the individually-optimal outcome of the
r&d game, defined via Proposition 1.
We then conclude our social welfare analysis with the following result:
Corollary 4 (Social welfare and policy schemes).
There is a need to implement a subsidy only if s = Ψ(F) 6= Θ(F) = h. In this case the
policy scheme is assigned via Proposition 3 with the welfare ordering following Lemma 7.
The subsidy scheme yielding maxσk Ds,h(W )
σk is implemented.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the question whether a government should interfere
with green technological change by granting a technology-specific subsidy, which is a
frequently observed practice (technology-specific feed-in tariffs for renewables being the
most prominent example). We have studied a setting, where an incumbent firm might
have an incentive to keep a new technology from the market or delay its entrance. We
have shown that different cases of strategic behavior can arise and require different types
of intervention.
Our results show that in many cases a time-limited interference with technological
change is indeed socially optimal. As technological development requires patents to pay off
and patents induce market power, there is a considerable danger of market failures. A firm
that owns a patent for a technology with limited potential but an initial quality advantage
can have an incentive to use this market power to prevent or delay the development of an
ultimately superior competitor. It is socially optimal to correct this problem. However,
it will often not be possible to use the best possible intervention, as it depends on the
potential of the new technology, which is likely to be unknown to the government. Thus
we have shown that even in cases of severe constraints of information, a government can
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and should interfere. Furthermore, if it should interfere, the level and duration of the
subsidy increase with the uncertainty.
The paper extends prior studies in several points. First, using a simple but coherent
model, we show how different cases of technology lock-in or development delay can arise
from the existence of market power (patents) without any further imperfections. Second,
we couple this market description with an analysis of interventions that could prevent
such a lock-in.
From a more application-oriented perspective, our paper casts some new light on
policies that aim to support green technological change. These policies are widely used
and are often criticized by economists, as they eliminate competition among technological
options. Our results show that there are cases where it is indeed reasonable to temporarily
reduce the effects of competition via technology-specific subsidies. Most interestingly, a
less informed government should subsidize new technologies more and longer, as long as
it can still ascertain that developing the technology is socially desirable.
Appendices
A Solution for simultaneous game
Maximum principle yields (current value) Hamiltonians for both players:
Hj = p∗j(t)N∗j (t)−
1
2
g2j + λj (gA QA − gB QB − δ) (A.1)
with co-state dependent optimal investments of both players resulting from F.O.C.s:
g∗A = λA QA, g
∗
B = −λB QB (A.2)
and co-state equations:
λ˙A = (1 + r) λA − 2 SA1 δ − SA2 , λ˙B = (1 + r) λB − 2 SB1 δ − SB2 . (A.3)
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The resulting canonical system of the game includes co-state equations (A.3) and the
state equation:
δ˙ = λA Q
2
A + λB Q
2
B − δ. (A.4)
Together, they form a three dimensional linear system of ODEs, which admits a closed-
form solution. The resulting state evolution is given by Eq. (18).
Given the solution path for co-state equations, optimal investments of both firms can
be written as functions of time and the demand parameters, given by Eqs. (19), (20),
where we set X := (r + 2)2 − 4
9
z2(Q2A + Q
2
B) (thus real-valued solution exists only if
X > 0) and where FA,B1,2,3 are functions of demand parameters and investment efficiencies
(see Appendix F for their definitions).
Observe also, that as long as δ(t) is monotonically decreasing in time, at some point tE
it could the case that the initial leader will exit the market as soon as qA(t
E) ≤ 0, resulting
in the uncontested monopoly of the new technology after that time. The condition for
that is
δ¯∗ ≤ −q¯B (A.5)
where bars denote steady state values, and the steady state of qB is given by the associated
two-states problem. To simplify the analysis we further assume this is not the case, and
the difference in technologies potentials is not too high, allowing the initial leader to stay
on the market.14
B Strategic pricing case derivations
Formally, firm A sets the price so that it makes maximal profit of firm B non-positive:
ΠB|pA(t)=pSA(t) = maxpB ,gB
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
pB(p
S
A, δ)NB −
1
2
g2B
}
dt ≤ 0. (B.1)
14otherwise the game becomes piecewise-defined and incentives for strategic behavior of firm A are
further increased.
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Using the revenue function of firm B and its best response to the price set by firm A given
by (13), we get
pB (pA)NB =
p2A
8 z
+
1
2
(x¯B − δ
2
) pA +
z δ2
8
− z x¯B δ
2
+
z x¯2B
2
. (B.2)
Hence, the strategic price is
pSA = z (δ − 2 x¯B) . (B.3)
As long as the price A is set at most on this level, the investments of the firm B are zero,
as the co-state equation (A.3) transforms into
λ˙B = (1 + r)λB, lim
t→∞
e−rtλB(t) = 0. (B.4)
This implies a co-state value of zero for all t and thus, by Eq. (A.2), an investment
of zero. With zero investment of firm B, the distance between technologies increases,
which in turn increases the level of the strategic price. Thus, if the strategic price can be
implemented at time zero, it will stay at that value for all the time until the entry of the
firm B is possible. This implies the following result.
Lemma 8 (Possibility of strategic pricing).
Whenever
δ0 > 2 x¯B, (B.5)
it is possible for the leading firm A to set the strategic price (25) and prevent firm B from
developing its technology.
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C Value functions
For strategic and monopoly regimes:
ΠSA =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
pSAN
S
A −
1
2
(
gSA
)2}
=
=
SS1
1 + r
δ0 +HA, (C.1)
ΠMA =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
pMA N
M
A −
1
2
(
gMA
)2}
=
=
SM1 − 12
(
FM1
)2
√
Xm
δ20 − 2
√
Xm
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(
FM1 − SM1 QA
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2
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)
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(
SM1 M
∗ + 1
2
FM1 F
M
2
)
√
Xm(r +
√
Xm)
δ0 +MA.
(C.2)
where the coefficients MA, HA,M
∗ are given in the Appendix F and depend only on the
demand parameters and efficiency of investments of firm A. Denote the roots of the
polynomials (C.1), (C.2) by δAS , δ
A
M .
Under the simultaneous development regime values of both firms at initial time are:
Π∗B =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
p∗BN
∗
B −
1
2
(g∗B)
2 + λB(g
∗
AQA − g∗BQB − δ)
}
dt (C.3)
Π∗A =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
p∗AN
∗
A −
1
2
(g∗A)
2 + λA(g
∗
AQA − g∗BQB − δ)
}
dt. (C.4)
Again, all new parameters are given in the Appendix F. Denote the roots of the polyno-
mials (C.3), (C.4) by δB∗ , δ
A
∗ , respectively. We assume that parameters of the game are
such that leading coefficients in all profit functions are positive for firm B and negative
for firm A implying their profit functions depend on δ0 in opposite directions.
The duration of a strategic pricing that is necessary to prevent the entry of firm B, is
thus given by the time, when the δ resulting from strategic pricing (δS(t)) equals δB∗ . We
denote this by tP .
Firm A will be able to permanently prevent the follower from entering the market by
temporary strategic pricing, whenever tP < ∞. If the polynomial (C.3) has no positive
real roots, only the permanent strategic pricing may prevent the enter of firm B to the
market.
So far, our analysis has produced the following result.
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Lemma 9 (Prevention of entry).
For temporary strategic pricing to result in a permanent prevention of development of
technology B, it is necessary that the roots of polynomial (C.3) are real and that
min{δB∗ } ≤ δ¯S. (C.5)
Then firm A may prevent entrance of B by strategically pricing during
tP = − ln
(
SS1 Q
2
A + (1 + r)qB(0)− (1 + r)δ∗B
SS1 Q
2
A − (1 + r)δ0
)
. (C.6)
Otherwise, a permanent prevention of entry is only possible via permanent strategic pric-
ing.
This result shows what firm A has to do, in order to keep firm B permanently out of
the market. The next question is whether it is optimal for firm A to act in this way.
D Piecewise monopoly dynamics
The profit stream under temporary strategic pricing ΠPA, defined by Eq. (29), is bounded
by (C.1) from below and by (C.2) from above. It is a decreasing function of tP . Thus
if ΠSA ≥ 0, the strategic pricing is feasible for any tP . Moreover, even for negative ΠSA,
there might exist a tP < ∞ such that strategic pricing is still feasible, if we have ΠMA >
0. Therefore those two profit streams give a sufficient and necessary condition for the
feasibility of strategic pricing.
Lemma 10 (Feasibility of strategic pricing).
For strategic pricing to be feasible, it is necessary that δ0 ≥ min{δM}. It is sufficient that
δ0 ≥ δS, where δS, δM are roots of equations (C.1), (C.2).
The next question is whether strategic pricing is also profitable. This question can be
reduced to comparing (29) and (C.4). As long as both (29) and (C.4) are positive, firm
A has an incentive for strategic pricing for the duration tP , whenever
∃0 < tP : ΠPA − Π∗A ≥ 0. (D.1)
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Using Lemma 10, we can express this condition again in terms of roots of polynomials.
Note that the differences in profit streams is the second degree polynomial in δ0. The
roots of this polynomial characterize the threshold levels of profit streams, for which the
monopolistic and permanent strategic regimes are more profitable than the simultaneous
development regime. As the temporary strategic pricing regime leads to a profit stream
in between monopolistic and permanent strategic pricing, we get the following result.
Lemma 11 (Profitability of strategic pricing).
For strategic pricing during tP > 0 to be profitable, it is necessary that δ0 ≥ min{δ−}, and
it is sufficient that δ0 ≥ min{δd}, where δ−, δd are the roots of polynomials ΠMA −Π∗A and
ΠSA − Π∗A, respectively.
E Temporary delay case
This depends on the roots δd of the polynomial Π
S
A,∞−Π∗A,∞, which, by (C.4) and (C.1),
can be written as
0 = −S
A
1 − 12
(
FA1
)2
√
X
δ2d +
SS1
1 + r
δd+
+ 2
√
X
(
FA1
(
FA3 +
1
2
FA2
)
+ SA1 G
∗ − SA2
)− r (SA1 G∗ − 12FA1 FA2 )√
X(r +
√
X)
δd +HA −GA (E.1)
As long as at least one positive real root δd exists, it gives a criteria to stop strategic
pricing, if it is implemented. The time till which market entrance of firm B is delayed is
then given by
td = − ln
(
SS1 Q
2
A + (1 + r)qB(0)− (1 + r)δd
SS1 Q
2
A − (1 + r)δ0
)
(E.2)
The incentive for a strategic delay of entrance is given by the discounted profit stream of
firm A under switching from strategic price to the simultaneous development regime at
time td and at the level of technology δd:
ΠSA,td =
∫ td
0
e−rt
{
pSAN
S
A −
1
2
(
gSA
)2}
dt+
∫ ∞
td
e−rt
{
p∗AN
∗
A −
1
2
(g∗A)
2
}
dt ≥ Π∗A,∞ (E.3)
We conclude this case with the following result.
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Lemma 12 (Strategic delay).
For strategic pricing to result in a temporary delay of firm B entry, it must hold that
min{δd} ≤ δ0 < max{δd} ≤ δ¯S < min{δ∗B} (E.4)
with delay duration td.
If
min{δd} ≤ δ0 ≤ δ¯S < max{δd}, δ¯S < min{δ∗B} (E.5)
only permanent strategic pricing is profitable and effective.
Proof. As long as (E.4) is met, it is initially profitable for firm A to use strategic pricing.
But it cannot shift to monopolistic pricing, as δ never becomes large enough to prevent
firm B’s entry altogether. Firm A will thus stop strategic pricing, if it is no longer
profitable compared to the simultaneous development case. In contrast, if the value of
δ at which this occurs is higher than the value required by (E.5), the strategic pricing
regime will hold forever.
F List of coefficients
Optimal investments parameters competitive case:
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(F.1)
Optimal investments parameters monopolistic case:
FM1 =
(
SM1 Q
2
A − 12(1 + r)
)
(2 + r −√Xm)
QA(2SM1 Q
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(F.2)
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Competitive profits coefficients:
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Strategic profit coefficient:
HA =
1
2
(xA + 2xB)
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Monopolistic profit coefficients:
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Coefficient for sufficient subsidy:
Xsuff =
√
X1δ2 +X2δ +X3
X1 = z
2 + 32z + 54
X2 = (4z
2 + 152z − 272)xA + 32xB(z − 6)
X3 = (4z
2 + 116z − 608)x2A − 64xAxB(z + 6)− 64x2Bz (F.6)
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